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I. INTRODUCTION
The primary purpose of this article is to provide a sufficient
legal basis upon which the United States may base its recently re-
affirmed policy of protecting sunken warships. This article will
illustrate international practices recognizing the important obli-
gation to attach preferential protection to warships using the con-
cept of sovereign immunity.'
In the closing hours of his presidency, William J. Clinton
issued the following Statement entitled "United States Policy for
the Protection of Sunken Warships"2 :
Thousands of United States government vessels, aircraft
and spacecraft ("State craft"), as well as similar State craft
of foreign nations, lie within and in waters beyond, the ter-
ritorial sea and contiguous zone. Because of recent
advances in science and technology, many of these sunken
government vessels, aircraft and spacecraft have become
accessible to salvors, treasure hunters and others. The
unauthorized disturbance or recovery of these sunken State
craft and any remains of their crews and passengers, is a
growing concern both within the United States and inter-
nationally. In addition to deserving treatment as
gravesites, these sunken State craft may contain objects of
a sensitive national security, archaeological or historical
nature. They often also contain unexploded ordnance that
could pose a danger to human health and the marine envi-
ronment if disturbed, or other substances, including fuel oil
and other hazardous liquids, that likewise pose a serious
threat to human health and the marine environment if
released. I believe that the United States policy should be
clearly stated to meet this growing concern. Pursuant to
the property clause of Article IV of the Constitution, the
1. For a discussion of protecting sunken warships based on the presence of
deceased soldiers and sailors, see Jason R. Harris, The Protection of Sunken Warships
as Gravesites at Sea, 7 OCEAN AND COASTAL L.J. (forthcoming 2001).




United States retains title indefinitely to its sunken State
craft unless title has been abandoned or transferred in the
manner Congress authorized or directed. The United
States recognizes the rule of international law that title to
foreign sunken State craft may be transferred or aban-
doned only in accordance with the law of the foreign flag
State. Further, the United States recognizes that title to a
United States or foreign sunken State craft, wherever
located, is not extinguished by passage of time, regardless
of when such sunken State craft was lost at sea.
International law encourages nations to preserve
objects of maritime heritage wherever located for the bene-
fit of the public. Those who would engage in unauthorized
activities directed at sunken State craft are advised that
disturbance or recovery of such craft should not occur with-
out the express permission of the sovereign, and should
only be conducted in accordance with professional scientific
standards and with the utmost respect for any human
remains. The United States will use its authority to protect
and preserve sunken State craft of the United States and
other nations, whether located in the waters of the United
States, a foreign nation, or in international waters.
The Statement seeks to protect state craft only, thereby
inherently making a distinction between state and non-state
craft.3 Although there are particular reasons to protect warships,
some of which are addressed by the Statement,4 not all of the
rationales offered in the Statement justify the distinction between
State and non-State vessels.
Furthermore, the Statement attempts to protect sunken war-
ships by stating they should be given "deserving treatment as
gravesites," as objects of "archaeological or historical nature" and
to encourage the protection of "maritime heritage." These expla-
nations alone are not unique to warships.
The Statement apparently affirms Sea Hunt, Inc. v. Unidenti-
fied Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels5 , where the Fourth Circuit held
that Spain did not abandon (either expressly or by implication)
3. Although the difference between state vessels, non-state vessels and the mixed
use of state vessels is a challenging issue, it is beyond the scope of this article. This
article will assume that "State vessels" include warships.
4. Such as unexploded ordnance and technology secrets, arguments that likely
diminish in strength over time as technologies and secrets become outdated and less
valuable.
5. 221 F.3d 634 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, (pending at the time the statement
was issued), Sea Hunt, Inc. v. Kingdom of Spain, 121 S.Ct. 1079 (2001).
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title to two warships, La Galga and the Juno, which sank in U.S.
waters in 1750 and 1802, respectively.'
Following the holding of Sea Hunt and the issuance of the
Statement, both of which attempt to prevent salvage attempts on
sunken warships, the need arises for a well-grounded explanation
as to why there is a unique interest in protecting warships not
abandoned by the nation of origin. The concepts of sovereign
immunity offer such an explanation.
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
This article addresses one justification for the protection of
sunken warships. Specifically, the warship and its contents
should retain the privileges of sovereign immunity. These privi-
leges may be asserted against domestic intruders via the assertion
of property rights, and against international would-be finders, sal-
vors, and looters based on international law and practice.
While some authors note that U.S. courts have failed to ade-
quately examine why sunken warships are accorded special treat-
ment from a policy perspective,7 there is a moderately well
developed body of customary international law that governs the
treatment of sunken warships and military aircraft.' Nonethe-
less, since "[tihe policy of the United States concerning abandon-
ment of its sunken vessels has not always been consistent,"9 it is
necessary to examine past practices by states to determine if any
trends or customs have developed regarding the treatment of
warships.
A. Domestic Protection of Sunken Warships - Property
Versus Sovereignty
1. United States v. California
Although the two are related, protection based on property
6. Id. at 639
7. See, e.g., Jerry E. Walker, A Contemporary Standard for Determining Title to
Sunken Warships: A Tale of Two Vessels and Two Nations, 12 U.S.F Mar. L.J. 311,
312, apparently discarding the cases discussed supra in section IV, B, 3. In United
States v. Steinmetz, 763 F. Supp. 1293, 1299 (D.N.J. 1991), aff'd, 973 F.2d 212, 222 (3d
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 984, the District Court held that "clearly warships
are to be treated uniquely.. and their remains which are clearly identifiable as to the
flag State of origin are clothed with sovereign immunity and therefore entitled to a
presumption against abandonment".
8. J. Ashley Roach, Sunken Warships and Military Aircraft, Office of the Legal
Advisor, U.S. Department of State, at http://history,navy.mil.branches/orgl2-7j.htm.
9. U.S. v. Steinmetz, 973 F. 2d 212, 222 (3d Cir. 1992).
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rights must be distinguished from protection based on sovereign
immunity. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in U.S. v. California"
criticizes the majority for abandoning the distinction between
"dominium" and "imperium"." "Dominium" is the notion of own-
ership comparable to the law of property. "Imperium," however,
invokes the superior rights of the federal government to act as a
sovereign in international affairs. These two concepts create an
inherent tension or, at least an alternative basis of domestic pro-
tection over sunken warships. The two concepts have been
applied to sunken warships inconsistently, yet often successfully
as demonstrated below.
2. Department Of State Practices
In 1980, James H. Michel, Deputy Legal Adviser of the
Department of State, was asked to express the Department's
views on the ownership of Japanese vessels that were sunk by
United States forces during World War II.1" His response essen-
tially denies any transfer of property rights in U.S. sunken war-
ships due to their resting in foreign waters.
However, Michel's memorandum creates a presumption of
non-abandonment for nineteenth and twentieth century vessels
but acknowledges that abandonment may be implied in some cir-
cumstances." This has been interpreted in U.S. v. Steinmetz 4 to
reflect an inconsistent treatment regarding sunken warships.
3. U.S. Navy Practices
The Navy bases its protection of wrecks on the Property
Clause,'5 Articles 95 and 96 of United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea'6, and established principles of international mari-
10. 332 U.S. 19, 43 (1946).
11. See id. The distinction is utilized here to organize the materials that follow in
a conceptual manner rather than to affirm a distinction made in the dissent to a
landmark case.
12. Marian Nash Leich, 8 Cumulative Digest of United States Practice in
International Law 999, 999-1006 (1980) (citing memorandum attached to letter by
Deputy Legal Adviser of the D.O.S., James H. Michel (Dept of State File No. P81
0004-0338) in response to a request for DOS's view on the ownership of a Japanese
vessel sunk by the United States during WWII).
13. Id.
14. Steinmetz, 973 F.2d at 222 (citing to Deputy Legal Adviser of the D.O.S.,
James H. Michel's memorandum).
15. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cl. 2.
16. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/122
(1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1271 (1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
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time law. 7 The Navy is obligated to protect and maintain historic
properties such as shipwrecks under the National Historic Preser-
vation Act."8 Yet it has been said that sovereign immunity is the
raison d'etre for the Navy's policy of protection over its ship and
aircraft wrecks. 19
The Navy's view is that the terms "commissioned", "decom-
missioned", and "stricken" have no relevance to title.2" A ship
without commission is still government property, but is not allo-
cated to particular duties. Striking a ship from Naval records
refers to removing the craft from active duty status. A decommis-
sioned or stricken vessel may later be put back into service. 1
Therefore, the distinction while acknowledged, will not be dis-
cussed in this article.
4. Property Assertions: Public Versus Private Interests
It is easier and more efficient for a large, economically-sound
interest to voice its opinion as to the treatment of its property
than it would be for individual citizen-claimants to do so based on
their interest in the remains and effects of their relatives aboard.
The U.S. Navy is an immense operation with massive resources.
Such an organization is more readily able to assert its desire for
domestic and international lawmakers to recognize a property
right over its sunken vessels. This "highly organized and finan-
cially backed" theory of protection helps explain why states are
more readily able to assert and retain a property interest in their
sunken warships.
Critics have stated that a state owner should retain an inter-
est so as not to impliedly abandon a vessel for a longer time period
than a commercial vessel since it is more likely to have the physi-
cal, financial, and political means to assert such rights.2 A
counter-argument to the property assertions is that the public
owns the property as "taxpayers" and thus should be entitled to
17. Robert S. Neyland, Sovereign Immunity and the Management of United States
Naval, Shipwrecks, available at http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/orgl2-7h.htm
at 2 (last visited April 18, 2001).
18. 16 U.S.C. 470, et. seq [hereinafter NHPA].
19. Neyland, supra note 17, at 7.
20. Id. at 5.
21. Id. at 6.
22. Sarah Dromgoole & Nicholas Gaskell, Who Has a Right to Historic Wrecks and
Wreckage? 2 INT'L J. CULTURAL PRoP. 217, 234 (1993). Among the numerous statutes
and regulations that govern the appropriate methods to dispose of government
property are 10 U.S.C. 7305, 40 U.S.C. 484, and 32 C.F.R. 172.
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the salvage. Such arguments are, however, generally ineffective
absent some individualized aim or effect.
English common law provides that title to abandoned prop-
erty found at sea by British citizens vests in the Crown.2" The his-
tory and development of the state's rights to unclaimed wrecks
has been traced to early Roman law. Initially, when goods were
cast ashore after shipwreck they were considered to belong to the
original owner and any other persons taking possession of the
goods were considered thieves.24 During the Dark Ages, it became
customary for lords to seize wreckage of ships that washed ashore
and the rights of the owners were defeated by the local feudal lord.
This "feudal right of shipwreck" flourished during the Middle
Ages.
25
Over time a distinction developed between types of wreck-
age.2" Henry III set out a rule enacted in 1275 by Edward I in the
Statute of Westminster that if a man or animal escaped from a
shipwreck alive, the vessel and its contents would be held for him
for a year and a day.27 After such time, the property would vest in
the Crown. The negative effect of this was that finds were being
concealed. As a result, the Crown began to take only one-half of
the find to encourage the finder to declare the riches. But by 1836
the finder's rights were reduced to one-third.2" In conclusion, the
roots of U.S. law regarding the assertions to property rights over
sunken warships can be traced to a long standing tradition of
exercising property rights over its own belongings and those of
others when items rested upon its shores or ocean floors.
5. U.S. Vessels in U.S. Waters - The Assertion of the
Property Clause in Action
The domestic law surrounding sovereignty of U.S. warships in
U.S. waters is well established. "It is well settled that title to
property of the United States cannot be divested by negligence,
delay, laches, mistake or unauthorized actions by subordinate offi-
cials."29 Yet some inconsistency is apparent. The issue of aban-
23. Jeffrey T. Scrimo, Raising the Dead: Improving the Recovery and Management
of Historic Shipwrecks, 5 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 271, 293 (2000).
24. Dromgoole & Gaskell, supra note 22, at 240.
25. Id.
26. Adventurae maris versus wreccum maris.
27. See Dromgoole & Gaskell, supra note 22, at 241-42.
28. Id. at 242-43.
29. Hatteras v. U.S.S. Hatteras, 1984 AMC 1094, 1098 (S.D. Tx 1981), affd, 698
F.2d 1215 (1983).
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donment, while inexorably tied to the concepts in this section is
left for more detailed discussion in other forums.
Early cases holding that the government had abandoned its
interests were not uncommon and courts failed to address the spe-
cial warship status of the vessel. In Baltimore, Crisfield &
Onancock Line Incl. v. United Statesl0and Somerset Seafood Co. v.
United States, 1 the court held that the U.S.S. Texas was aban-
doned despite any affirmative act by the government. Subsequent
cases further addressed and developed the inaction doctrine. In
Ervin v. Massachusetts Co., 2 the court held that the U.S.S. Mas-
sachusetts had been abandoned by inaction. Moreover, in Chance
v. Certain Artifacts Found and Salvaged from The Nashville,33 the
court held that a Confederate warship embedded in Georgia's sub-
merged lands was abandoned in favor of the state. Finally, in
State ex. rel Bruton v. Flying "W" Enterprises, Inc.,4 the court held
several Confederate blockade-runners (and a Spanish privateer)
were abandoned in favor of North Carolina.
Over time the judiciary departed from its reliance on the inac-
tion doctrine. Increasingly, or at least occasionally, courts have
found ways to hold that sunken U.S. military property was not
abandoned. 5 On January 11, 1863 the U.S.S. Hatteras was sunk
after a thirteen-minute battle against the C.S.S. Alabama approx-
imately twenty miles south of Galveston, Texas. The Navy did not
attempt to salvage the vessel. 6 On March 25, 1976, the Secretary
of the Navy made a formal declaration of abandonment. 7 Pursu-
ant to this declaration, Hatteras, Inc. salvaged items from the ves-
sel. The Hatteras Court ruled that the Secretary of the Navy
failed to comply with the requirements of the Property Act. 8 The
Act requires the Navy to determine if the property has any com-
mercial value, and if so, whether the estimated cost of care would
exceed the estimated proceeds from the sale. The court held that
there was never a written determination as to the commercial
30. 140 F.2d 230, 235 (4th Cir. 1944).
31. 193 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951).
32. 95 So.2d 902, 908 (Fla. 1957).
33. Chance v. Certain Artifacts Found and Salvaged from The Nashville, 606 F.
Supp. 801 (D.C. Ga. 1984).
34. 273 N.C. 399, 414 (1968).
35. See Hatteras, 1984 AMC at 1098; International Aircraft Recovery, LLC v.
Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Aircraft, 218 F. 3d 1255 ( 1 1th Cir. 2000).
36. Hatteras, supra note 29, at 1094.
37. Id. at 1095.
38. 40 U.S.C. 512 (1949); see also The Property Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.
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value of the Hatteras prior to declaring the vessel to be aban-
doned, therefore, the property was inappropriately deemed
abandoned.9
The effect of such an unauthorized abandonment of U.S. prop-
erty is ineffective since such property cannot be divested by negli-
gence, delay, laches, mistake, or unauthorized actions by
subordinate officials.40
In a recent case, a war plane was "stricken" from the inven-
tory of active aircraft in 1943 but was held to not necessarily have
been abandoned. 4' The term "stricken" instead implies a removal
from the maintenance and reporting requirements, but does not
indicate a final disposition of the aircraft. 42 This case also reaf-
firms the government's right to decline salvage.'
In Klein v. Unidentified, Wrecked and abandoned Sailing Ves-
sel,44 a vessel found in Biscayne National Park in 1978 was not
entitled to be salvaged since the United States owned the sub-
merged lands in a National Park. A similar result was declared in
Lathrop v. Unidentified, Wrecked and abandoned Sailing Vessel,45
this time in the waters of the National Park at Cape Canaveral.
The court noted that possession of abandoned property alone is
not sufficient. Instead, a salvor must acquire possession
lawfully.4"
In conclusion, there are a relatively large amount of U.S. stat-
utes and case law dealing with sunken warships, many of which
point to the protection of such objects by either property or sover-
eign immunity concepts. Yet this domestic law alone is not a suffi-
39. Hattejas, supra note 29, at 1100-1.
40. Id. at 1098 (citing United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947)); Lee Wilson
& Co. v. United States, 245 U.S. 24 (1917); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States,
243 U.S. 389 (1917).
41. International Aircraft Recovery, LLC v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned
Aircraft, 218 F.3d 1255, 1257-9 ( 1 1 th Cir. 2000).
42. Id. at 1259 (quoting Dr. William Dudley, Dir. of Naval History for the U.S.
Navy); Kern Copters, Inc. v. Allied Helicopter Serv., Inc., 277 F.2d 308 (9 th Cir. 1960).
43. Id. at 1262.
44. 758 F. 2d 1511,1515 (11th Cir. 1985) (involving an English vessel).
45. 817 F. Supp. 953, 967 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
46. Id. at 963 (citing to Martha's Vineyard Scuba HQ v. Wrecked and Abandoned
Steam Vessel, 833 F. 2d 1059 (1st Cir. 1987)). The doctrine of rejection says that
salvors do not have the inherent right to save a distressed vessel (citing to Jupiter
Wreck, Inc. v. Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 691 F. Supp 1377 (S.D. Fla. 1988)). In
addition, a salvage award may be denied if a salvor forces its services on a vessel
despite a rejection of the services (citing to Platoro Ltd., Inc. u. Unidentified Remains,
695 F. 2d 8 9 3 (5 th Cir. 1983)). Id. at 964. Furthermore, the doctrine of constructive
rejection that allows a state to reject a salvor's services. See Platoro, 695 F. 2d at 902.
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cient basis to assert the broad protection afforded by the
Statement which would apply internationally. Instead, due to the
traveling nature of a warship, international case law and practice
must be examined.
B. Sovereign Immunity as Against Other Nations
1. UNCLOS - Generally
The doctrine of warship immunity was first codified interna-
tionally in the 1910 Brussels Salvage Convention.47 Warships are
entitled to immunity from non-flag states via UNCLOS Article 32
entitled "Immunities of warships and other government ships
operated for non-commercial purposes."48 Article 95 states that
"[wiarships on the high seas have complete immunity from the
jurisdiction of any state other than the flag states."49 Article 96
states that "ships owned or operated by a state and used only on
government noncommercial service shall, on the high seas, have
complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any state other than
the flag state." 0
2. Is a Sunken Warship Entitled to Sovereign Immunity?
A "warship" is defined in Article 29 of UNCLOS as a "ship
belonging to the armed forces of a State bearing the external
marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the com-
mand of an officer duly commissioned by the government of the
State and whose name appears in the appropriate service list or
its equivalent, and manned by a crew which is under regular
armed forces discipline."5'
It has been argued that a sunken warship loses its immuni-
ties upon sinking as it is no longer under the command of an
officer, nor does a disciplined crew man it; warships may only be
47. For a history of the doctrine, see Frederic A. Eustis, III, The Glomar Explorer
Incident: Implications for the Law of Salvage, 16 VA. J. INT'L. L. 177, 179 n. 18 (1975).
48. UNCLOS, supra note 16, 21 I.L.M. at 1276.
49. UNCLOS, supra note 16, 21 I.L.M. at 1288.
50. Id. Warships are singled out in various other parts of UNCLOS: complete
immunity on the high seas (95), may seize pirate vessels (107), may exercise the right
to visit on the high seas (110), may exercise the right of hot pursuit (111), are exempt
from compliance with protection and preservation of the marine environment (236).
There is a distinction between a "warship" as defined in Art. 29 versus a vessel owned
and operated by the state using it for non-commercial purposes. This distinction,
although an important one, is beyond the scope of this paper.
51. UNCLOS, supra note 16, 21 I.L.M. at 1275-76.
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state organs while they are manned, 2 are under the command of a
responsible officer, and are in service of the state; and a ship-
wrecked warship, abandoned by her crew, can no longer be a state
organ.
5 3
A domestic case consistent with the view of loss of sovereign
immunity is Baltimore, Crisfield & Onancock Line, Inc. v. United
States.54 In holding that a battleship was no longer U.S. property,
the court reasoned that sunken vessels cannot legally be classified
as vessels since they are not capable of navigation.5 Some
authors have concluded that this means a warship could thus lose
its immunity. 56 These opinions, however, do not account for alter-
native rationales unique to the protection of warships, such as
sovereign immunity and the aspects regarding the proper burial of
soldiers.
Other authors have taken the opposite view arguing that the
U.S.'s international practice and policy regarding its sunken war-
ships has been one of non-abandonment.57 While the question of
coverage under current international codified law is debatable, it
is nonetheless clear that there are other more universal and
deeply rooted fundamental reasons to protect sunken warships
because of human remains that may exist therein."
52. 1 OPPENHEIM'S INT'L LAw §560 at 1165 (9 th ed. 1996). A subsequent footnote
indicates, however, that a warship wreck nonetheless remains government property.
Id. at n. 2.
53. Luigi Migliorino, The Recovery of Sunken Warships in International Law, in
ESSAYS ON THE NEw LAW OF THE SEA 244, 251 (Budislav Vakas ed., 1985) (citing a
speculation and other contrary opinions in Lucius Caflisch, Submarine Antiquities
and the International Law of the Sea, 13 NETH. Y.B. IN'r'L L. 3, at 22 n. 74(1982)).
However, Migliorino hedges from the initial statement about losing immunity to a
fall-back position that creates a distinction between the right to recover a warship
and the right to dispose of the warship. This right to dispose of the warship includes
the right to convert ownership or pass title to a warship. Id. at 254.
54. 140 F.2d at 230 (4th Cir. 1944).
55. Id.
56. Walker, supra note 7, at 352; Anastasia Strati, The Protection of Underwater
Cultural Heritage: An Emerging Objective of the Contemporary Law of the Sea, 221
(Shigeru Oda, ed. 1995). A vessel ceases to be a ship regardless of its status as state-
owned, once it is sunken, thus it not subject to flag state jurisdiction and has lost
immunity. Caflisch, supra note 52, at 22 n. 74. A floating "assemblage" in the form of
a boat abandoned on the high seas is not recognized internationally as a ship unless
there is evidence that the state intends to continue to use the assemblage for
navigation. See Caflisch, supra note 52, at 25 n.81.
57. State vessels and aircraft are entitled to sovereign immunity whether or not
they are sunken. Roach, supra note 8, at 351.
58. See Harris, supra note 1.
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3. The Travelling Sovereign Entity - Heralds,
Ambassadors, Marching Armies, and Bank Accounts
This section will explore a basis of protecting sunken war-
ships by comparing the status of heralds, ambassadors, marching
armies, and certain international bank accounts to sunken
warships.
During medieval warfare, heralds played an important role as
evidenced in Shakespeare's Henry V.59 Heralds were experts in
the code of chivalry who served as national representatives by car-
rying messages between warring states.' ° The special role of
ambassadors was acknowledged in Shakespeare's Henry V and
Henry VL.' Because ambassadors were responsible for negotiat-
ing between nations, their safe passage was essential. Ambassa-
dors, like heralds, have traditionally been entitled to immunity.
In The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,2 the French, acting
under the order of Napolean, seized and converted John McFad-
don's vessel.6" During a voyage, in order to avoid poor weather
conditions, the now-French vessel entered the port of Philadel-
phia. While in port, the vessel was arrested by McFaddon.6 The
United States, through Attorney General Pinkney, sided with
France to argue that a U.S. citizen cannot successfully ask the
court to order the arrest of a foreign warship. Chief Justice Mar-
shall agreed.
Pinkney's most convincing argument related to the parallels
drawn between a warship and an ambassador. An ambassador is
generally exempt from ordinary jurisdiction. In many instances,
problems or violations would result in the ambassador being
asked to leave the state with a referral to the courts of his home
country. 5 The immunities afforded to ambassadors, claimed
Pinkney, stem from the implied assent that Grotius deemed con-
ventional and Rutherford deemed to be the natural law of
nations.6 Pinkney then argued that a warship is not ordinary
property of a nation, but is national property, comparable to an
59. THEODOR MERON, HENRY'S WARS AND SHAKESPEARE'S LAws 173-4 (1993)
(noting the herald was protected through an ancient tradition). Heralds would carry
white wands to signify one of the only recognized immunities in warfare. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 11 U.S. 116 (1812).
63. Id. at 117-18.
64. Id. at 118.
65. Id. at 132.
66. Id. at 133.
112
PROTECTING SUNKEN WARSHIPS
army passing through another territory.67
Marshall determined that although generally a sovereign
never cedes its jurisdiction, there are limited exceptions based on
the voluntary restraint of the exercise of the state's jurisdiction.6 8
First, there is no immunity when an individual voluntarily enters
another jurisdiction. At that point, the individual is generally
subject to the foreign nations' laws.69 Here, the waiver of immu-
nity appears to be by the home state. Second, a sovereign cedes
jurisdiction if it permits foreign troops to pass through the sover-
eign state.70 Such grants of permission imply a waiver or tempo-
rary license of the jurisdiction, the revocation of which would
result in serious detriment to further communications and trusts
between the States.
Finally there is "the immunity which all civilized nations
allow to foreign ministers.' Marshall offers two rationales as to
why a foreign minister is given immunity. First, a foreign minis-
ter is considered "in the place of the sovereign he represents or by
a political fiction suppose him to be extra-territorial, and, there-
fore, in point of law, not within the jurisdiction of the sovereign at
whose Court he resides."72 Marshall reasoned that without such
an exemption or restraint on the exercise of sovereignty, nations
would fear sending foreign ministers to other nations in an
attempt to maintain peaceful relations. In addition, the minister
would "owe temporary and local allegiance to a foreign prince, and
would be less competent to the objects of his mission.
In rejecting McFaddon's claim, the Court afforded immunity
on the basis that warships affect the "power and dignity" of the
flag state. 4 To allow arrest of a foreign warship then constitutes a
challenge to the nation. Such unfriendly attitudes are impracti-
cal, particularly here when the French warship was in port due to
poor sailing conditions. The same rationale can easily be applied
to imperiled or sunken warships. Marshall concluded that war-
ships entering the port of another state are exempt from the
67. Id. at 134.
68. This restrictive action is comparable to the restraints in warfare and the
allegiances of soldiers. See Harris supra note 1.
69. The Schooner Exchange, supra note 62, at 137.
70. Id. at 139.
71. Id. at 138.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 139.
74. Id. at 144.
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power of its jurisdiction.75 This case represents an example of an
international limitation on the exercise of sovereignty.
Other nations have followed the reasoning from The Schooner
Exchange. In The Prins Frederick,7" an English court denied a sal-
vage award for services provided to a Dutch warship. The court
cites The Schooner Exchange in support of its argument,77 but fails
to cite any English precedent. Comparable cases had arisen
regarding Spanish warships, but the Spanish voluntarily relin-
quished title.7 s The court held that salvage only applies to com-
mercial vessels. The root of treating sovereign vessels differently
stems from Roman law, which distinguished from commercial
articles and those connected with the public service of the state.79
Roman law only permitted a lien to attach to commercial goods."
The court justified the differential treatment of sovereign ves-
sels on the basis that the militaries of different nations are subject
to different regulations. "[T]he relations between commanders
and seamen of ships of war are very distinct from those of persons
composing the crews of merchant vessels."81 The same analogy
may be drawn in modern times relating to differences between the
order and methods of command in the U.S. Navy and the U.S.
Merchant Marines. The missions are different (though related)
and many differences exist between the two that illustrate the dis-
tinct goals of each organization.
The court drew the same analogy to foreign principles such as
ambassadors or other figures exercising public functions in a for-
eign state. A similar privilege was noted for military forces pass-
ing through a foreign nation by consent.8 4 The court notes that
there is a "transient connection" of the flag state to the foreign
state. The rationale was offered that a mutual preservation of
rights is essential to the defense and independence of sovereign
75. Id. at 145-46. The immunity only applies to warships or vessels "engaged in
national pursuits." Id. at 144. Thus there is a "clear distinction" between the rights
of private trading vessels and public armed ships that make up the military force of a
nation. Id. at 143.
76. 2 Dods. 451, 482 (1820).
77. Id. at 463.
78. Id. at 473.
79. Id. at 455.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 457.
82. One example is that a merchant vessel pays by tonnage and a warship pays by
length overall so as not to give away what the warship is carrying.
83. The Prins Frederick, supra note 76, at 458.
84. Id. at 459.
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states."
The court acknowledged that warships are essential to the
very security of the state and if their service could be interrupted
by the arrest of a foreign nation, their purpose would be
defeated.8 6 Every sovereign has an "interest and duty... to main-
tain unimpeached its honor and dignity; and no attack upon these
can be suffered with any due regard even to its safety."87 If this
exception of coastal state sovereignty were not made, it would be
necessary for the warship (or, in the case of a sunken warship,
other warships) to engage in hostile measures to prevent the sal-
vage of the vessel to avoid jeopardizing the nation's integrity.
Such unnecessary hostility should not be tolerated on today's rela-
tively more heavily regulated seas. Instead, the court seems to
hint that a better way to earn money from salvage efforts is to
petition the flag state for a salvage award.
Subsequently, in The Constitution,88 the English Admiralty
court ruled that the English steam-tug, the Admiral, was not enti-
tled to a salvage award for services provided to the Constitution, a
US frigate grounded near Swanage. The court decided that the
Constitution was not subject to England's jurisdictional arrest
powers. On January 28, 1879, John Welsh, Minister of the United
States, stated in a letter to the British Foreign Office, that the
United States would not recognize the jurisdiction of High Court
of Justice in the case. 9 Subsequently, the English court heard
arguments by the U.S. government as a matter of courtesy. The
U.S. position was that there should be no English jurisdiction in
this case due to the doctrines pronounced in The Schooner
Exchange.9" In agreeing with the U.S. position, the court went on
to clarify its prior ruling in The Charkieh,s' which involved a non-
sovereign Egyptian vessel. Sir Robert Phillimore concluded that it
would be improper to allow a warship to be subject to the jurisdic-
tion of a foreign court.2
More recently, in Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank,93 a
U.S. court ruled that foreign bank accounts held in the U.S. by a
85. Id.
86. Id. at 468.
87. Id. at 472.
88. The Constitution, 48 P.D. at 13 (1879).
89. Id. at 13.
90. See 11 U.S. at 116.
91. 8 L.R.-Q.B. 201 (1873).
92. The Constitution, 48 P.D. at 14.
93. Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 192 N.Y.S. 2d 469 (1959).
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sovereign state are immune from attachment. In this case, Wei-
lamann sought attachment of two USSR bank accounts held by
Chase Manhattan Bank. The court deferred on such international
interests to avoid embarrassing the executive branch. 4 The court
concerns itself solely with the position taken by the State Depart-
ment. 5 This position is to respect the immunity of the foreign
nation's bank accounts. The court held that it would not assume
jurisdiction over a foreign country or its property in a manner
antagonistic to U.S. policies."
Historic case law indicates that state property remains state
property unless expressly relinquished or captured.97 If the prop-
erty is identified as foreign state property, there is little doubt
that the salvor has the responsibility to turn the items over to the
proper owners.9"
The protection of warships based on sovereign immunity is
inherently more deeply entrenched and deeply rooted than is pro-
tection for financial bank accounts. Therefore, the United States
is justified in taking the position that its sunken warships are
entitled to protection based on their retention of sovereign
immunity.
4. Generally Recognized Ways to Lose Sovereign
Immunity
It is appropriate to point out that there are certain generally
recognized ways that sovereign immunity can be compromised
under international law. First, under international law, sovereign
immunity may be lost by the capture of a warship during battle
but before actual sinking.99 Second, sovereign immunity may be
relinquished by international agreement."' Finally, sovereign
94. Id. at 471. Thus offering insight as to why the President may have issued the
Statement - knowing of the tendency by the judicial branch to defer to the executive
branch regarding matters of international concern, it was likely that the Supreme
Court would defer to the executive's international policy decision to affirm Sea Hunt.
95. Id. at 473.
96. Id. at 472. This judicial policy affords insight as to why the 4 ' Circuit opted to
follow the U.S. Navy's longstanding policy of granting sovereign immunity to
warships.
97. The Constitution, 48 P.D. at 39; The Prins Frederik, 2 Dods. at 482.
98. TIIEODORE D. WOOLSEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw 73 (1879).
99. An example involves the Russian vessel, the Admiral Nakimov discussed
supra section II B-5(c). See also Neyland, supra note 17, at 4-5.
100. For an example, see Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, U.S.-Japan, art
14(a)(2)(I), 3 U.S.T. 3169; see also Compact of Free Association, Oct. 10, 1986, U.S.-
Marshall Islands, T.I.A.S. No. 11661, granting title to U.S. vessels sunk during
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immunity may be lost by express abandonment, gift or sale."0 '
These specific methods imply that there is a need to recognize spe-
cific ways to prevent the loss of sovereign immunity.
5. Practices by Nations With Respect to Warships
The Department of State has asserted that non-abandonment
by the mere passage of time for sunken warships has become a
well-established international practice and that absent actual
capture, there can be no loss of title to a warship. I°2 Although
there is arguably no restriction on coastal state jurisdiction over
sunken warships, in practice, coastal states frequently request
flag state permission before recovering sunken warships. Such
requests, however, are generally denied.0 3
There has been an international distinction between the laws
of "capture" as applied to warships versus non-warships. Once a
warship is "captured,"104 the capturing state acquires physical pos-
session plus an immediate transfer of title. Notably, one Attorney
General Opinion [hereinafter "Opinion"] dated March 29, 1900
states the contrary view. The Opinion would allow the U.S. to
claim title to Spanish wrecks on the coast of Cuba.' The Opinion
was prefaced as suggestive rather than being a formal opinion
from which to guide subsequent action.0 6 However, the Opinion
called for in that matter did not require a decision on ownership of
the vessels and no authorities were cited for the Statement.'
0 7
Title to non-warships, however, is acquired only through a deter-
mination by a prize court.' 8 Therefore, sinking, absent capture of
Atomic Bomb testing at Bikini and Kwajalein Atoll. See also Neyland, supra note 17,
at 4-5.
101. For example, in the War of 1812, the United States relinquished title to the
Hamilton and the Scourge. See Neyland, supra note 17, at 4-5; see Roach, supra note
8, at 351. There are many U.S. provisions regarding when it can divest itself of title.
See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. 7305-6, 7545; 40 U.S.C. 484(e); 32 C.F.R. 172, 736; 46 U.S.C.A.P.P.
1158.
102. Leich, supra note 12, at 1005. This is, of course, subject to doubt. Others have
argued that the custom that a sovereign never abandons their vessels is of recent
origin. David J. Bederman, The UNESCO Draft Convention on Underwater Cultural
Heritage: A Critique and Counter-Proposal, 30 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 331, 337 n. 33
(1999).
103. For greater discussion, see Migliorino, supra note 52, at 253.
104. Generally requiring physical possession plus intent. See Leich, supra note 12,
at 1000 (citing The Grotius, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 229 (1815)).
105. 23 Op. Att'y Gen. 76, 78 (1900).
106. Id. at 77.
107. Leich, supra note 12, at 1002.
108. Id. at 1001 (citing 2 L. Oppenheim, INTERNATIONAL LAw: DispuTEs, WAR, AND
NEUTRALITY 474-75 (7 th ed. 1952); 3 C. Hyde, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS
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a belligerent vessel, does not grant title to the enemy.I°9
However, belligerents may salvage a vessel or its artifacts
while hostilities continue. I° But following termination of hostili-
ties, the sunken vessel and remains of the crew are entitled to
special respect as war graves and should not be disturbed."' Sub-
sequently, the flag state is entitled to use all lawful means to pre-
vent unauthorized disturbance of the sunken vessel." 2 This
section explores, though does not necessarily exhaust, incidents of
international practice regarding the treatment of sunken
warships.
a. U.S. Vessels in Non-U.S. / Foreign Waters
The United States has been fairly consistent in its response to
foreign requests to salvage U.S. warships in foreign waters.
Although the U.S. policy is one of non-abandonment, coastal
states may, when a foreign vessel is sunk within its waters, none-
theless be entitled to restrict access to the site."' Scholars argue
that beyond coastal state waters, the only state that should be
allowed to regulate access is the flag state.14 Because the coastal
state policy may be unknown until an incident occurs, it becomes
important to look at past practices by the United States and other
nations.
United States policy has been exemplified in several situa-
tions. In 1908, the Cuban government asked the United States as
to the status of if its rights to warships, including the Maine, sunk
in Cuban waters during the Spanish-American War. The United
States responded that it retained its proprietary rights over the
vessels."'
In a telegram from the Secretary of State to the Ambassador
INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 2022, 2027 (2d.ed. rev. 1945); C.
Colombos, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 780, 781 (6' ed. rev. 1967); H. Smith,
THE LAw AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA126 (3d ed. 1959); 11 M. Whiteman, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (1968); The Starr, 16 U.S. (3 Wheaton) 37, 40 (1818); Oakes u.
United States, 30 Ct. Cl. 378, 401 (1895).
109. See Roach, supra note 8, at 351-52.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 352; see Steinmetz, 973 F.2d at 212; see also International Aircraft
Recovery, L.L.C. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Aircraft, 218 F. 3d 1255,
1261 (11 Cir. 2000).
113. Roach, supra note 8, at 352.
114. See id.
115. Leich, supra note 12, at 1004 (citing 11909] For. Rel. U.S., 236-37 (1914);
[1910] For. Rel. U.S. 417-19 (1915)).
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in Japan on May 6, 1938, the United States rejected an offer from
the Japanese Foreign Office to salvage the U.S.S. Panay indicat-
ing that there is "no authority in law for acceding in any case to
such a request"."' The United States Department of State
informed the American Embassy at Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, that
the United States retained title to vessels it owned at the time of
their sinking and that salvage required consent."' The Australian
Government has also been denied its request to recover a U.S.
submarine sunk in the Sydney Harbour during WWII."'
b. Foreign Vessels in U.S. Waters; Spain's Peculiar
Practices
In Sub-Sal, Inc. v. The Debraak,"' a Delaware court held that
a British Brig-of-war had been abandoned despite no express
renunciation. With the exception of this British-flag warship,
most litigation involving foreign warships in U.S. waters have
involved Spanish wrecks.
Spain's history of claiming sunken warships is inconsistent at
best. Spain has generally been reserved about asserting title to
its shipwrecks. 120 For instance, Spain did not claim title to the
Girona, found in 1967, nor another vessel thought to be part of the
Spanish Armada, found in 1985 off of the Irish coast. 2 '
Spain has failed to claim numerous warships and commercial
vessels lost in U.S. waters prior to Sea Hunt. Among these non-
claims is the Nuestra Sefiora de Atocha, which sank in 1622, dur-
ing a hurricane off of Florida. The vessel's fate resulted in the
legendary finds of Mel Fisher and large amounts of salvage
litigation."'
116. 4 FOREIGN RELATIONS TO THE UNITED STATES, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 212-214,
SETTLEMENT BY JAPAN OF THE CASE OF ArTACK ON THE U.S.S. "PANAY," SUNK
DECEMBER 12, 1937, IN THE YANGTZE ABOVE NANKING (1938); Maritime Navigation
and Transportation, 9 Whiteman DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw § 15, at 221-22.
117. Leich, supra note 12, at 1004 (citing Secretary of State Rusk to American
Embassy, Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, Airgram, No. A-27, April 29, 1965).
118. Michael G. Collins, The Salvage of Sunken Military Vessels, 10 INT'L LAw 683,
694, n. 101 (1976), reprinted in Michael G. Collins, The Salvage of Sunken Military
Vessels, 8 J. MAR. L. & COM. 433 (1977).
119. Sub-Sal, Inc. v. The Debraak, available at 1992 WL 39050 (D. Del. 1992).
120. Dromgoole & Gaskell, supra note 22, at 229.
121. Walker, supra note 7, at 337-38.
122. Fla. Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, 621 F.2d 1340 (5th Cir. 1980). For
examples of other abandoned Spanish warship wrecks, see, e.g., Marx v. Guam, 866 F.
2d 294 (9th Cir. 1989); Cobb Coin Co. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned
Sailing Vessel, 525 F. Supp. 186 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Platoro Ltd v. Unidentified Remains
of a Vessel, 614 F.2d 1051 (5' Cir. 1980); Lathrop v. Abandoned, Wrecked and
2002]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1
On January 11, 1965, the Spanish Ambassador wrote a letter
to the United States indicating that Spain may abandon its trea-
sure ships of the 1715 Pate Fleet lost off of the Florida coast." '
The letter, however, did not address title to warships. Most
recently, Sea Hunt held that Spain retained title to La Galga and
the Juno, which sank off of the coast of Virginia.124 Spain's argu-
ment for protection, however, was supported, if not initiated, by
the U.S. 2 5 Therefore, Spain's practices regarding protecting its
sunken warships have been peculiar and its actions with respect
to future discoveries are unpredictable.
c. Foreign Vessels in Non-U.S Waters
Many foreign nations follow the U.S. policy against abandon-
ment of warships. However, foreign nations do not give warships
universal treatment.
The British torpedoed the German's U-859 submarine in the
Strait of Malacca and salvors subsequently fought for salvage
rights. The Singapore High Court ruled that there was no aban-
donment by the German government.'26 A Norwegian court faced
a similar issue over the German submarine U-76 that sank in
1917 near Norway. The Court held that the rights of a state over
its sunken warships do not lapse by mere passage of time.127
Additionally, in 1980, the Soviet Union protested Japanese
salvage of the "Admiral Nakhimov." On May 27, 1905, the war-
ship sank in Japan's territorial waters in the Battle of the Tsu-
shima during Russo-Japanese War.12 The Japanese position was
that the vessel had been captured before the vessel sank. The
Director of Legal Affairs Division of the Treaties Bureau
explained that the Japanese Naval warships, the S.S. Soadomaru
Unidentified Vessel, 817 F. Supp. 953, 966, n.23 (M.D. Fla. 1993); Treasure Salvors,
Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d 330, 337 (5th
Cir. 1978); MDM Salvage, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing
Vessel, 631 F. Supp. 308, 311-12 (S.D. Fla. 1986); Treasure Salvors, Inc. v.
Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 556 F. Supp. 1319, 1325 (S.D.
Fla. 1983); Soba v. Fitzgerald, 1993 AMC 120 (P.R. 1992).
123. Joint Appendix, Sea Hunt, Inc. v. Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels,
221 F. 3d 634 (4 Cir. 2000).
124. See generally Sea Hunt, 221 F. 3d 634.
125. Brief of Amici Curae United States, Sea Hunt, Inc. v. Unidentified
Shipwrecked Vessesl or Vessels, 221 F. 3d 634 (4th Cir. 2000).
126. Simon v. Taylor, 2 Lloyd's Rep 338, 345 (Singapore High Court 1974).
127. Nordjso Dykker Co. v. Hording Skipsopphugning, Norsk Retstidende 346
(1970).
128. 29 ANN. REV. OF JAP. PRACTICE 185 (1986).
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and the S.S. Shiranui, found the Russian ship hoisting a white
flag and with no intention of fighting. The Sadomaru rescued the
crew and boarded the vessel to raise the Japanese flag. Therefore,
the Japanese were of the opinion that they had successfully cap-
tured the Admiral Nakhimov before it sank.
129
Russia took the position that international law granted com-
plete immunity to sunken warships.'3 ° Although the Russian posi-
tion is quite clear, it was inapplicable in this case because the
vessel had been "captured." There does seem to remain the ques-
tion of whether the vessel was sufficiently sunken at the time it
was allegedly "captured," such that the vessel could not truly be
claimed in the name of Japan, particularly because the bow was
water-logged and the crew was escaping the vessel.'3 '
Items recovered from the Japanese warship, Awa Maru, that
sunk in Chinese territorial waters during WWII were deemed
property of Japan.132 Japan maintains the position that state ves-
sels and their associated artifacts, whether they are sunken or
not, remain entitled to sovereign immunity.'33
England's Ministry of Defence claims title to all sunken ves-
sels unless sold. The British warship H.M.S. Birkenhead sank in
South Africa's territorial sea in 1852 while transporting troops
and possibly large amounts of gold. 3 1 South Africa permitted sal-
vage of the vessel over British opposition.3 5 The conflict was
resolved through an agreement by the nations to share any gold
found.'36 A similar agreement was reached through a series of cor-
respondences between Great Britain and Italy to resolve the sal-
vage of the H.M.S. Spartan, which sank in Anzio Bay in 1944.137
The British frigate Lutine (originally a French vessel claimed
by Britain as a prize of war) sank off the coast of the Netherlands
in 1799. The Dutch claimed title to the vessel over Lloyd's of
London. In 1857, the dispute was settled and each party received
129. Id. at 186.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 187.
132. Walker, supra note 7, at 338.
133. Roach, supra note 8, at 351.
134. Walker, supra note 7, at 336.
135. Id. at 336.
136. See Exchange of Notes Constituting Britain and Northern Ireland and the
Government of Italy regarding the Salvage of the H.M.S. Spartan, Rome, Nov. 6,
1952, 158 U.N.T.S. 432 (1952); see Dromgoole & Gaskell, supra note 23, at 337 n. 100-
01 (referring to War Graves and National Monuments Act (South Africa, 1969)).
137. Exchange of Notes Agreement Between U.K.-Italy, 158 U.N.T.S. 432 (Nov. 6,
1952); see Walker, supra note 7, at 336.
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half of the gold bullion found. 8'
Finally, the Netherlands have agreed to transfer title of its
vessels, sunk off the coast of Australia, in exchange for Australia's
recognizing that the Netherlands has some interest in articles
recovered from the vessel." 9 It appears that many nations,
despite a lack of an official Statement such as that asserted by the
U.S., have nonetheless adopted the same or similar provisions by
practices involving sunken warships. As technological capabilities
increase among other nations, it is likely that these practices will
become more prevalent, and a more sufficient body of customary
law may be established.
6. Incidental U.S. Misbehavior - Project Jennifer
The United States' own activities concerning foreign warships
have not been entirely consistent with its newly declared State-
ment. In 1968 the United States received reports of a large Soviet
convoy searching the Pacific Ocean. 4 ' It then examined tape
recordings made by underwater sound sensors on the ultra-secret
research ship Mizar and discovered a noise indicating an under-
water explosion, apparently caused by a spark that ignited gasses
trapped in the hull of the submarine.14' After the Soviets ended
their two-month search for the vessel, and during the next seven
years, the Soviets failed to search for the submarine.' Mean-
while, the United States eventually discovered that the Soviet
submarine was approximately 750 miles northwest of Hawaii.
1 4 3
The United States then began covert operations to recover the
vessel in an operation that has been compared to "a fanciful blend
of James Bond and Jules Verne."144 The efforts involved the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency ("CIA") and the assistance of eccentric bil-
lionaire Howard Hughes, who had various ties and interests in
CIA operations. 14 A 618 foot long, 115.5 foot beam, 36,000 ton
vessel was built with the aid of Global Marine Inc.146 The Glomar
Explorer, as she was known, had the publicized purpose of mining
138. Dromgoole, supra note 22, at 337 n. 103.
139. Agreement Concerning Old Dutch Shipwrecks, Netherlands-Australia, Aust.
TS No. 18 (1972) (appended as Schedule 1 to Australia's Historic Shipwrecks Act
(1976)); see Dromgoole, supra note 22, at 228-9, n. 102.
140. Eustis, supra note 47, at 177 n. 1.
141. The Great Submarine Snatch, TIME, March 31, 1975, at 20.
142. Eustis, supra note 47, at 183.
143. Id. at 177 n. 1.
144. Alpern, CIA's Mission Impossible, NEWSWEEK, March 31, 1975, at 24.
145. TIME, supra note 141, at 20.
146. Id. at 21.
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valuable manganese nodules.'47 The true mission of the vessel
somehow remained a secret despite the theft of Hughes' secret
documents including a memo relating to his participation in Pro-
ject Jennifer.14 Jacques Cousteau, however, remained suspicious
of the activities since it was known that Hughes was not going to
make a large profit from the operation, and that "Howard Hughes
does not involve himself in uneconomic undertakings."149 It was
speculated that Hughes' incentive in the operation was to become
untouchable by the U.S. government in exchange for his assis-
tance in the covert operation."'
The elaborate efforts to disguise the operation seem to indi-
cate at least apprehension by the United States that the recovery
project was in violation of international law.' This indicates that
the United States has never retreated from its position that war-
ships remain the property of the flag state. Instead, it merely
shows the United States, when it believes national security is a
greater factor, is willing to bend international and its own stated
policy." '2
In 1974 the United States attempted to raise the wreck from
17,000 feet."3 During the attempt, the cables rattled due partly to
the water pressure while raising the vessel, which caused the ves-
sel to break. The aft two-thirds of the vessel (including the con-
ning tower, missiles, and the code room) fell back to the seabed
147. Collins, supra note 118, at 694 n. 101.
148. TIME, supra note 141, at 26. It was speculated that the robbery was a set-up
by either Hughes or the CIA. Id.
149. Id. at 26.
150. Id. at 27 (quoting former FBI agent Robert Maheu).
151. Alfred P. Rubin, Sunken Soviet Submarines and Central Intelligence; Laws of
Property and the Agency, 69 Am. J. INT'L L. 855, 857 (1974).
152. This is comparable to the principles in criminal justice that just because a law
is occasionally broken (i.e. - murders do occur) does not mean that the law itself does
not exist (i.e. - there are still laws that prohibit and likely effectively deter the act of
murder) An incidental violation of the law should not necessarily be cited to prove
that the law itself does not exist. The United States' conduct in Project Jennifer has
been criticized by many authors as being in violation of international law and
creating a loss in trustworthiness in the United States, (see generally Rubin, supra
note 150, Collins, supra note 118), not as having created a new international law.
Amidst Project Jennifer, the CIA came under investigation for various alleged
violations including alleged involvement in political assassinations of foreign officials,
unauthorized investigations of domestic figures and harassment of ideological leaders
of factional groups within the United States. Collins, supra note 117, at 434 n. 12.
Some expected President Ford to have contemplated revamping the CIA chain of
command and expected CIA director William Colby to be replaced. Alpern, supra note
143, at 32.
153. Eustis, supra note 47, at 177 n. 1.
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and the remaining one-third was successfully salvaged.'
Although no nuclear missiles or coding information were appar-
ently discovered, several bodies were found in the wreckage.'55
However, no official inventory was ever taken.'
The United States was aware that it would raise several
Soviet bodies from the wreck and prepared for what it deemed to
be proper arrangements. The Glomar contained cooling facilities
that could hold up to one hundred bodies. In what must have cer-
tainly been an odd site, the United States performed a "bizarre
ceremony" consisting of a rendition of the Soviet national anthem
over a loudspeaker while a funeral service was read in Russian
and English.'57 At the same time, a CIA cameraman filmed the
burial at sea in a sound-and-color motion picture. 55 Ten bodies
were recovered. A source assisting in the peculiar operation
stated that "it was simply our feeling that we should not be in a
position of being accused of disrespect for the bodies of Russian
seamen."159 The question remains as to why the cooling facilities
were necessary if the bodies were to be buried at sea.
Project Jennifer was the first salvage attempt of a foreign mil-
itary vessel sunk in international waters.' This is likely due to
the incapability prior to this incident to salvage a vessel in such
extensive depths. Technology has clearly altered the possibilities
opportune to violating what was once a clearly stated interna-
tional rule of law. Project Jennifer has gone "largely ignored" due
not only to Russia's lack of protest while the United States carried
on the operation,' 61 but also because of the domestic scrutiny sur-
rounding the CIA's alleged improprieties.
One interpretation is that the rules of sovereign immunity of
warships do not apply in certain situations. Among these are
removal when obstructing navigable waterways within their
internal waters or territorial sea, and legitimate self-defense and
espionage activities.6 2 A source in the French Foreign Ministry
was quoted to say that the incident will have "no impact on inter-
154. TIME, supra note 141, at 25.
155. Eustis, supra note 47, at 177 n. 1.
156. Collins, supra note 118, at 434 n. 9.
157. Alpern, supra note 144, at 31.
158. Id.; TIME, supra note 141, at 25.
159. Alpern, supra note 144, at 25.
160. Collins, supra note 118, at 435 n. 18.
161. Likely due to embarrassment for not having the technology to conduct the
operation. See Id. Though they later protested via proposals to the 1982 UNCLOS.
See Harris, supra note 1.
162. Leich, supra note 12, at 1005, (citing various articles concerning Glomar,
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national relations because the CIA was simply doing its job
according to the rules of the game."163
State Department lawyers initially disagreed over whether a
warship could only be recovered by its own State. Those favoring
recovery by other states noted that the Soviet Union had recov-
ered several warships belonging to other states."' Navy lawyers
protested the operation, but the State Department rebutted that
the Russians had salvaged several military vessels belonging to
other countries.16 The Soviets have taken a position similar to
that of the United States, namely that there can be no abandon-
ment of State property without explicit renunciation of title.
III. CONCLUSION
Due to modern technology, the likelihood that more sunken
warships will be discovered has increased. This article attempts
to demonstrate that the United States' position has been that such
vessels are entitled to protection.
One theory that would allow a flag state such as the United
States to protect its sunken warships is the assertion of sovereign
immunity over the warship. As discussed, international state
practice has occasionally varied, but has been generally consistent
with the concept of protection. However, the occasional inconsis-
tent treatment throughout history has been apparent, but criti-
cized, as evidenced by domestic case law and Project Jennifer.
In conclusion, the notions of sovereign immunity articulated
in this article demonstrate why the Statement is justified in
allowing the United States to assert protection over its sunken
warships. Still, other more well-entrenched concepts of protection
should be explored and asserted to reaffirm the United States'
position of protecting sunken warships as asserted in the
Statement.
hence implying that Project Jennifer was a legitimate self-defense or espionage
activity).
163. Alpern, supra note 144, at 24.
164. Id. at 25.
165. Id. at 29.
166. A. Volkov, MARITIME LAW, 33-34 (1969); see Eustis, supra note 47, at 185 n. 53.
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